In the mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a desired social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of all agents' types. In a standard one-shot mechanism, the agents interact only once and the designer has no way to adjust agents' types. Hence, the designer may be in a dilemma in the sense that even if she is not satisfied with some outcome with low profit, she has to announce it because she must obey the mechanism designed by herself. In this paper, we investigate a case where the designer can induce each agent to adjust his type in a one-shot mechanism. After defining a series of notions such as adjusted types, optimal adjustment cost and profitable Bayesian implementability, we propose that the revelation principle does not hold in this generalized case. Finally, we construct an example to show that the designer can obtain an expected profit greater than the maximum profit that she can obtain in the traditional optimal auction.
Introduction
In the framework of mechanism design theory [1, 2, 3] , there are one designer and some agents. 1 The designer would like to implement a desired social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of agents' types. However, agents' types are modelled as their private properties and unknown to the designer. In order to implement the social choice function, the designer constructs a mechanism which specifies each agent's strategy set (i.e., the allowed actions of each agent) and an outcome function (i.e., a rule for how agents' actions get turned into a social choice).
Traditionally, in a standard mechanism agents interact only once (i.e., in oneshot settings), and the designer has no way to adjust agents' types. Hence, the designer may be in a dilemma in the sense that even if some profile of agents' strategies leads to an outcome with low profit, she has to announce it because she must obey the mechanism designed by herself. The designer may improve her situation by constructing a multi-period mechanism, or holding a charity auction [4] . Engers and McManus [4] proposed that agents' bids in a first-price charity auction are greater than those in a standard (non-charity) auction [5] because of the charitable benefit that winners receive from their own payments. Besides the multi-period mechanism and the charity auction, there may exist another way for the designer to escape from the dilemma.
For example, suppose the designer is an auctioneer who sells a good in a hotel, and each agent is a bidder whose initial valuation to the good (i.e., private type) is low. The gorgeousness of the hotel is an open signal to all agents that induces each agent to adjust his valuation to the good before he submits his bid to the designer. Without loss of generality, we assume that each agent's valuation and bid both increase concavely with the hotel rent spent by the designer, and the designer's utility is a linear function of the winner agent's bid. From the viewpoint of the designer, as long as her marginal utility is greater than her marginal rent cost, it is worthwhile for her to continue investing on the rent cost. Obviously, the designer will obtain the maximum profit when her marginal utility is equal to her marginal cost. Thus, if agents' types are adjustable in a one-shot mechanism, the designer may actively escape from the above-mentioned dilemma and yield an outcome better than what would happened without doing so.
In this paper, we focus on the one-shot settings and investigate a case where the designer can induce each agent to adjust his type in a one-shot mechanism. In Section 2, we define notions such as adjusted types, optimal adjustment cost, profitable Bayesian implementability and so on. Then we propose that the revelation principle does not hold in this generalized case. In Section 3, we construct an example to show that by choosing the optimal adjustment cost, the designer can obtain an expected profit greater than what she can obtain at most in the traditional optimal auction model.
Theoretical analysis
Following Section 23.B of MWG's textbook [1] , we consider a one-shot setting with one designer and I agents, indexed by i = 1, · · · , I. Let X be a set of possible alternatives. Assumption 1: Each agent i is assumed to observe a private parameter (i.e., type θ i ) which determines his preference over alternatives in X. Let Θ i be the set of agent i's all possible types. Let Θ = Θ 1 × · · · × Θ I , θ = (θ 1 , · · · , θ I ) ∈ Θ.
Definition 1:
For any x ∈ X, each agent i's utility is denoted as u i (x, θ i ) ∈ R, where θ i ∈ Θ i , and the designer's utility is denoted as u d (x) ∈ R.
Definition 23.B.1 [1] : A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : Θ → X that, for each possible profile of the agents' types θ ∈ Θ, assigns a collective choice f (θ) ∈ X.
Definition 23.B.3 [1] : A mechanism Γ = (S 1 , · · · , S I , g(·)) is a collection of I strategy sets S 1 , · · · , S I , and an outcome function g : S 1 × · · · × S I → X. A strategy of each agent i in Γ is a function s i (·) : Θ i → S i . Let s(·) = (s 1 (·), · · · , s I (·)).
Assumption 2: Assume that in a mechanism, each agent i can play his strategy s i without any cost. Hence agent i's profit from the outcome x is just his utility u i (x, θ i ). 2 Assumption 3: Assume that in a mechanism, the designer constructs an outcome function and announces a cost c ≥ 0 which she will spend to perform the outcome function. The cost c is observable to all agents and acts as an open signal. The outcome function is denoted as g c (·) : S 1 × · · · × S I → X, and the mechanism is denoted as Γ c = (S 1 , · · · , S I , g c (·)). After learning the cost c, each agent i adjusts his private type from the initial value θ 0 i ∈ Θ i to a new value θ c i ∈ Θ i , 3 and then plays strategy s i (θ c i ). At last, the designer announces g c (s 1 (θ c 1 ), · · · , s I (θ c I )) as the outcome. The cost c is also denoted as adjustment cost. Thus, although the designer does not know agents' private types exactly, she can induce each agent to adjust his type in a one-shot mechanism.
Definition 2: For any adjustment cost c ≥ 0 and each agent i's initial type θ 0 i ∈ Θ i , by assumption 3 each agent i's preference over the alternatives in X is determined by his adjusted type θ c i ∈ Θ i . For each i = 1, · · · , I, let
A type adjustment function is denoted as µ(θ, c) : Θ × R + → Θ, in which µ(θ, 0) = θ for any θ ∈ Θ, i.e. zero adjustment cost means no type adjustment.
Assumption 4: For any θ ∈ Θ and adjustment cost c ≥ 0, the designer is assumed to know type adjustment function µ(θ, c), the initial type distribution φ 0 (·) and the adjusted type distribution φ c (·).
Definition 3: For any c ≥ 0, given an SCF f and φ 0 (·), the designer's expected utility is denoted asū d (c) = E θ c u d (f (θ c )), and her initial expected utility is denoted asū
Definition 4:
For any c ≥ 0, given an SCF f and φ 0 (·), the designer's expected profit is denoted asp d (c) =ū d (c) − c, and her initial expected profit is denoted asp d (0) =ū d (0).
Assumption 5:ū d (c) is assumed to be a concave function that satisfies the following inequalities,
Proposition 1: If there exists an adjustment cost c * ≥ 0 such that
then the designer will obtain the maximum expected profitp d (c * ) at c = c * . c * is denoted as the optimal adjustment cost. By Assumption 5 there holds
Definition 23.D.1 [1] : The strategy profile s * (·) = (s * 1 (·), · · · , s * I (·)) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mechanism Γ = (S 1 , · · · , S I , g(·)) if, for all agent i and all
Definition 23.D.2 [1] : The mechanism Γ = (S 1 , · · · , S I , g(·)) implements the social choice function f (·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γ, s * (·) = (s * 1 (·), · · · , s * I (·)), such that g(s * (θ)) = f (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Definition 5:
Given an SCF f and φ 0 (·), f is profitable Bayesian implementable if the following conditions are satisfied: 1) The optimal adjustment cost c * > 0, which means that the distribution of agents' private types is adjusted from φ 0 (·) to φ c * (·).
2) There exist a mechanism Γ c * = (S 1 , · · · , S I , g c * (·)) that implements f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. That is, there exists a strategy profile s * (·) = (s * 1 (·), · · · , s * I (·)) such that:
Proposition 2:
Given an SCF f and φ 0 (·), if f is profitable Bayesian implementable, then the designer's expected profit at the optimal adjustment cost is greater than her initial expected profit.
Proof: Given that f is profitable Bayesian implementable, then the optimal adjustment cost c * > 0. By Proposition 1,p d (c * ) >p d (0). ✷ 
. As a comparison, in the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium (see Definition 23.D.1), there is no type adjustment. Thus, the probability density function of type profile θ −i = (θ 1 , · · · , θ i−1 , θ i+1 , · · · , θ I ) in formula (1) is just φ 0 −i (·).
for all θ i ∈ Θ i (i = 1, · · · , I) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct mechanism Γ = (S 1 , · · · , S I , g(·)), in which S i = Θ i , g = f . That is, if for all i = 1, · · · , I and all θ i ∈ Θ i ,
for allθ i ∈ Θ i .
Proposition 23.D.1 [1] : (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash Equilibrium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism Γ = (S 1 , · · · , S I , g(·)) that implements the social choice function f (·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then f (·) is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3:
Given an SCF f and φ 0 (·), if f is profitable Bayesian implementable, then it cannot be inferred that f is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. That is, the revelation principle does not hold in this generalized case.
Proof: Given that f is profitable Bayesian implementable, then the optimal adjustment cost c * > 0, and there exist a mechanism Γ c * = (S 1 , · · · , S I , g c * (·)) that implements f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Thus, formula (2) is related to the type distribution φ c * (·) (see Footnote 5). As a comparison, in the notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility, there is no type adjustment in the direct mechanism by Definition 23.D.3 . Thus, formula (3) is related to the type distribution φ 0 (·).
Since θ c * = µ(θ 0 , c * ) and φ 0 (·) is not equal to φ c * (·), formula (3) cannot be inferred from formula (2) . Therefore, given that f is profitable Bayesian implementable, it cannot be inferred that f is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Consequently, the revelation principle does not hold in this generalized case. ✷ Proposition 4: If the designer's expected utilityū d (c) and expected profit p d (c) satisfy the following condition,
then the designer will obtain the maximum expected profit at c = 0. Put differently, in this case the designer cannot obtain any more profit by spending any cost to adjust agents' types.
Example
Following the auction model in MWG's book (Page 863, [1] ), suppose that there are one designer and two agents. Let the designer be an auctioneer who wants to sell a good, and each agent be a bidder whose valuation to the good is θ i ≥ 0, i.e., Θ i = R + . We consider a first-price-sealed-bid auction setting: Each agent i is allowed to submit a sealed bid b i ≥ 0. The bids are then opened, and the agent with the higher bid gets the good, and must pay money equal to his bid to the auctioneer.
Suppose that: 1) Each agent i's initial valuation (i.e., his initial type) θ 0 i is drawn independently from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. The distribution is known by the designer but the exact value of each θ 0 i is agent i's private information.
2) The designer holds the auction in a hotel, and the cost for renting the hotel is c ≥ 0.
3) The gorgeousness of hotel is characterized by the rent cost. Each agent i's valuation to the good is adjusted by the gorgeousness of the hotel: The more expensive the rent cost is, the greater the bidder's private valuation to the good is. 4) Let β > 0 be a coefficient, each agent i's valuation to the good (i.e., his adjusted type θ c i ) is a square root function of the rent cost c,
Thus,
That is, for any c ≥ 0, the following formulas hold:
Let θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 ), consider the social choice function
in which
The subscript d stands for the designer, and the subscript 1, 2 stands for the agent 1 and agent 2 respectively. y i = 1 means that agent i = 1, 2 gets the good. t i denotes agent i's payment to the designer. t d denotes the sum of two agents' payment to the designer. Obviously, for any c ≥ 0, y 1 (θ c ) = y 1 (θ 0 ), y 2 (θ c ) = y 2 (θ 0 ). Now we investigate whether this social choice function is Bayesian implementable. We will look for an equilibrium in which each agent i's strategy
Suppose that agent 2's strategy has this form, and consider agent 1's problem. For each possible θ c 1 , agent 1 wants to solve the following problem:
Because agent 2's highest possible bid is α 2 (1 + β √ c) when θ 0 2 = 1, it is evident that agent 1's bid b 1 should never more than α 2 (1 + β √ c). Note that
Hence we can write agent 1's problem as:
The solution to this problem is
Letting α 1 = α 2 = 1/2, we see that the strategies b * i (θ c i ) = θ c i /2 for i = 1, 2 constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this mechanism. Thus, there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this first-price-sealed-bid auction mechanism that indirectly yields the outcomes specified by the social choice function f (θ), and hence f (θ) is Bayesian Nash implementable.
Let us consider the designer's expected profit:
The designer's problem is to choose an optimal adjustment cost c ≥ 0 to maximize her expected profit, i.e.,
By appendix, the designer's initial expected profit isp d (0) = E[θ 0 1 y 1 (θ 0 ) + θ 0 2 y 2 (θ 0 )]/2 = 1/3. Thus, the designer's problem is reformulated as:
It can be easily derived that the optimal adjustment cost c * = β 2 /36. By Definition 5, f (θ) is profitable Bayesian implementable. The maximum expected profit of the designer is:
).
Obviously, when β > √ 3, there existsp d (c * ) > 5/12. Note that the designer's maximum expected profit in the traditional optimal auction with two bidders is 5/12 (see Page 23, the ninth line from the bottom, Ref [6] ). Therefore, if β > √ 3, then by choosing the optimal adjustment cost c * = β 2 /36, the designer can obtain an expected profit greater than the maximum expected profit given by the traditional optimal auction. Now we consider the ex ante expected profit of each agent i when agents' types are adjustable and the designer chooses the optimal adjustment cost c * . By appendix, the winner agent's expected profit is denoted as follows:
And the loser agent's expected profit is zero. Because the two agents are symmetric, each of them has the same probability 1/2 to be the winner agent. Therefore, the ex ante expected profit of each agent is 1/6 + β 2 /36.
As a comparison, we consider the ex ante expected profit of each agent in the traditional optimal auction model. By Ref [6] (Page 22), the ex ante expected payment of a bidder is
where r > 0 is the reserve price, [r, ω] is the interval of each agent i's valuation X i . Each X i is independently and identically distributed according to the increasing distribution function F . Fix a bidder, G denotes the distribution function of the highest valuation among the rest remaining bidders. For the case of two agents with valuation range [r, 1] and uniform distribution, there exist F (r) = r, G(r) = r, ω = 1, F (y) = y, g(y) = 1, for any y ∈ [r, 1].
By Ref [6] (Page 23), given that each of two agent's valuation to the good is uniformly distributed on interval [0, 1], the optimal reserve price r * = 1/2. Therefore, the ex ante expected payment of each agent in the optimal auction with reserve price r * = 1/2 is Recall that when agents' types are adjustable and the designer chooses the optimal adjustment cost c * = β 2 /36, the ex ante expected profit of each agent is 1/6 + β 2 /36. It can be seen that if β > 27/2, then 1/6 + β 2 /36 > 13/24.
To sum up, when agents' types are adjustable and the designer chooses the optimal adjustment cost: 1) If β > √ 3, then the expected profit of the designer is greater than her expected profit in the traditional optimal auction with reserve price 1/2. 2) If β > 27/2, then the ex ante expected profit of each agent is greater than his counterpart in the traditional optimal auction with reserve price 1/2.
Conclusions
In the standard mechanism design theory, the mechanism works in a one-shot manner. Each agent's type is considered as private and endogenous value, which means that the designer has no way to know and adjust each agent's type. Thus, although the designer constructs a mechanism in order to implement her favorite social choice function, she may behave like a passive observer in a dilemma after receiving a profile of agents' strategies: i.e., she must obey the mechanism and announce the outcome specified by the outcome function, even if she is not satisfied with the outcome.
In this paper, we investigate a case where the designer can induce each agent to adjust his type in a one-shot mechanism. In the generalized case, the designer may behave like an active modulator and escape from the dilemma. There are two novelties related to profitable Bayesian implementation: 1) For a profitable Bayesian implementable social choice function, it cannot be inferred that it is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. That is, the revelation principle does not hold in this generalized case.
2) If β > √ 3, then by choosing the optimal adjustment cost the designer can obtain an expected profit greater than the maximum expected profit yielded by the traditional optimal auction. If β > 27/2, each agent's ex ante expected profit is also increased.
